This
article was originally published on NACLA
News,
a new source of news and analysis on Latin America
and the Caribbean produced by the North American
Congress on Latin America (NACLA).
In February 2004,
U.S. Marines whisked away then-President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide from Haiti amid an armed
rebellion led by disgruntled former soldiers and
paramilitary actors. Despite the presence of a
United Nations peacekeeping force, violence and
poverty increased under the U.S.-backed interim
government led by Interim Prime Minister Gérard
Latortue, which courted the elite and its
international backers while alienating Haiti’s
overwhelming poor majority. The crisis hit a low
point last December and January, with daily
shootings in the poor neighborhood of Cité Soleil
and an outbreak of kidnappings.
President René Préval’s
electoral victory on February 7 suddenly brought
peace and hope to Haiti for the first time in two
years. Haiti’s poor flooded the polls to vote, and
one week later they blockaded nearly every major
road in the country to demand that the electoral
council name Préval the victor in the first round.
Préval has formed a coalition government and has
courted all sides of the political spectrum,
including both pro-Aristide militants from Cité
Soleil as well as light-skinned elites. He has taken
a similar approach in his foreign policy, seeking
help from the United States and France but also Cuba
and Venezuela. It is uncertain how long he will be
able to juggle these different interests, and more
than six months into his presidency, Préval
continues to remain largely an enigma.
Patrick Elie has been
an activist in Haiti since 1986, when the nation’s
popular movements drove former dictator Jean-Claude
Duvalier from the country. In the late 1980s, he
participated in these movements alongside René Préval,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Antoine Izmery, among
other pro-democracy activists struggling against the
military governments that assumed power after
Duvalier’s ouster. Elie was head of Aristide’s
security detail during his first presidential
campaign in 1990. When the former priest became the
country’s first democratically elected leader,
Elie assumed the position of anti-narcotics chief.
He went into exile after the military coup and
returned to become secretary of state for defense
when Aristide was restored to power in 1994. Since
1995, he has not served in government but has
remained politically active, and is a founding
member of SOS (Citizens’ Watchdog Center), a group
that seeks to promote the creation of a national
network of grassroots organizations.
Interview with
Patrick Elie and introduction by Reed Lindsay.
Reed Lindsay: How
accurate is the characterization of Haiti as a
country with a history or a culture of violence?
Patrick Elie: It is
an image of Haiti that is grossly distorted. The
so-called level of violence in Haiti pales in
comparison with violence in at least half the
countries in the world. Compare the history of Haiti
with that of England, France and the U.S. and
Germany. Don’t go back to the 1200s. Look back to
1804 and you have more violence in those countries
than in Haiti. So the characterization of Haiti as a
violent country is a bunch of hogwash. Why is there
tension and instability in Haiti? It is simply
because in Haiti you have 5 percent of the
population controlling 60 percent of the national
wealth, while 80 percent live in poverty. If you had
such a situation in any other country you’d have a
massacre or a civil war but that hasn’t happened
in Haiti, which speaks to the self-restraint of the
Haitian population. The instability of the last 20
to 25 years has been caused essentially by this
elite as well as their foreign allies who cannot
truly accept the principal of one citizen-one vote
because it would mean that they would lose their
privileges and influence. They have tried to quench
the will of the poor majority of Haiti and tried to
change the rules of the game because they’ve lost
in elections. If it were up to the Haitian people
(and when I say Haitian people I’m talking about
the vast majority of Haitians who are poor) there
would be both democracy and stability. If you look
at recent history, the Haitian people have chosen to
vote rather than to riot. They voted four times in a
row for the same political family, the same
political leaning, the same agenda. They
consistently have picked both democracy and
stability.
RL: How does the
United States government’s role in Haiti compare
to its role in other countries in Latin America?
PE: The role of the
U.S. in Haiti is no different than what it is in
other countries in Latin America in that the U.S. is
interested in dominating Haiti and dictating its
policy. That’s the reason why they cannot stand
the idea of somebody being elected with a large
majority because that means the government will not
be easy to manipulate as one that has very little
popular legitimacy and from the get-go this was the
United States’ problem with Aristide and Lavalas.
The role of the U.S. in all of Haitian history has
been egregious. The U.S. occupied the country for 20
years from 1915 to 1934 and left us with a
repressive army. But this pattern was not particular
to Haiti. Go to the DR, and they did the same thing
with Trujillo, and the same thing in Nicaragua with
Somoza. When the U.S. said it would support
democracies rather than military dictatorships, the
Haitians did not play along because they did not
want the type of democracy that the U.S. wanted to
impose. The Haitians, that is, the 80 percent of
Haitians who have been excluded for two centuries,
wanted a true democracy, where they would define the
agenda and get to pick who they wanted rather than
be forced to choose between candidates they don’t
like. Why has the U.S. occupied the country three
times? There are many reasons. There are economic
reasons, but even if you don’t concede to that,
Haiti has been a powerful symbol for having
overthrown slavery and becoming independent and for
what it’s doing now, which is proving that the
poorest people in the hemisphere, mostly illiterate,
can know more about democracy than the people who
are pretending to be beacons of civilization. And
they can stand up to the will of the U.S. The
movement that you see now in Latin America, the new
large social movements that are sweeping away the
traditional political parties, that also started in
a way in Haiti. For the U.S., Haiti is an example
that must be crushed, that must be made to fail.
That’s the principal interest of the U.S. in
Haiti.
RL: But the U.S.
hasn’t been the only first world country to play a
major role in Haiti in recent years. What about
France and Canada?
PE: France’s role
in Haiti is a direct result of the demand for
reparation that President Aristide put forward.
Also, I think France could never get over the defeat
of 1804. In all of Haitian history, never has a
French president set foot in Haiti. And Santo
Domingue is probably the French colony that played
the greatest role in French history. It was the
richest colony by far, and caused them to lose
Louisiana.
With Canada, I can point to a number of reasons why
they have switched directions in Haitian policy. One
is that Canada is aligning its policy with that of
the U.S. more and more after Iraq where they refused
to participate because the Chretien government would
have been defeated if Canada had gone into Iraq.
Haiti was an easy way to please the U.S. Haiti’s a
country with no army and no possibility to resist
regime change.
RL: How would you
characterize the role of Brazil, Argentina and Chile
in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti?
PE: The Latin
American countries had their own reasons and
interests. Brazil wants to be recognized as an
emerging power and wanted a seat in the UN Security
Council. For countries like Argentina and Chile,
they wanted to show that they are countries that
count. Despite the fact that I’m against the
occupation, if I had to choose to be occupied by
U.S. Marines, the French Legionnaires or the Latin
American countries and the UN, I’d pick the
latter, but the positive thing that could emerge
from this crisis is that Latin America will discover
Haiti and remember that Haiti is at the origin of
their own independence. Also, I believe that Haiti
will have the possibility of reorienting its
diplomacy toward the Caribbean and Latin America
rather than be prisoner of its destructive
relationship with the United States.
RL: What about the
allegations that UN troops tolerated and sometimes
committed abuses in the poor neighborhoods of
Port-au-Prince?
PE: I think there
were some people within the UN that were truly
sympathetic to the Haitian people. We cannot forget
the excesses of the UN, especially in the popular
neighborhoods like Cite Soleil. But we also must
recognize that the UN troops did not go all out in
military operations in poor neighborhoods as they
were being encouraged to do by the Haitian elite and
the governments of the U.S., France and Canada. As
President Préval has said, I would like to see the
UN mission continue. But we don’t need all those
men with guns. We’d rather see doctors and
technicians helping us.
RL: Can you evaluate
the last two years of rule by the interim government
of Primer Minister Gérard Latortue?
PE: I prefer to call
it a de facto regime or puppet regime because
that’s truly what it was. It was forced upon the
Haitian people by the intervention of February 29,
2004, and it was formed with hostility. It was a
government that was to be hostile to Lavalas and to
help eliminate the movement from the political
scene. It was a government that was a model of the
kind of government that the three countries that
intervened in Haiti would like to see at the helm of
the country: a government that answers not to the
population of the country but to foreign interests
and international organizations like the IMF. As for
an assessment of the last two years, I’m 56 years
old, and these have easily been the most difficult
and terrible years for the country I’ve ever seen.
First of all,
there’s the level of repression against the poor
people, against Lavalas. This government has allowed
ex killers and killers from the army to integrate
into the police into units that were nothing else
but death squads and go into popular neighborhoods
and assassinate people. And the economy has been a
disaster. The thing the government did was fire
4,000 to 5000 people in a country with 70 percent
unemployment. Of course this is not the type of
government the Haitian people would like to see at
the helm of the country.
RL: How does
Haiti’s popular movement compare to those in other
countries in Latin America?
PE: When Jean-Claude
Duvalier was forced to leave the country in 1986,
nobody expected that after 30 years of repression,
the first 15 of which were sheer terror, that there
would be this profound movement within the Haitian
population that would turn into thousands of
grassroots organizations. It was this movement that
was the origin of the Haitian saga of the last 20
years. It was this movement rather than the
political parties that stood up against the return
of dictatorship. It was this movement that
confronted the military government when it tried to
control the election in 1987 and this movement that
swept Aristide into power in 1990. And it was not
the political parties, but again this movement that
elected René Préval. Don’t believe for one
minute that Lespwa [the coalition of political
parties and organizations on whose ticket Préval
ran for president] has been anything but a label
that has been used for the election and a nice
slogan, but it was that vast social movement that
swept Préval into power. And I think that this
movement that literally exploded onto the scene in
1986 preceded what we’ve seen in Venezuela, in
Bolivia, and what may be appearing in Mexico and
maybe it is the wave of the future for countries
like Haiti in Latin America. Instead of trying to
mimic countries of Europe, maybe we can forge
regional tools for regional democracies. And I think
that is what Haitians are trying to do.
RL: Has this popular
movement grown stronger or weaker in the last 20
years?
PE: The popular
movement in Haiti is very much alive, but it is
already a bit better organized because it is battle
scarred but battle hardened also. I’ve seen the
crowds in 1986 and 1987, and the ones I’ve seen
out lately are different. It’s already starting to
resemble an army. There is more organization, there
is more discipline, and I think there is more
ability to stay the course. Of course, much remains
to be done, for example, there is no substitute for
a national coordination for such a movement. It
should exist. For the moment, it is a very loose
coordination. That’s where the new political
leadership will emerge from. If anything, the last
election signals the end of Haiti’s traditional
political class. When I say traditional, I mean both
those who come from the traditional right and the
traditional left. You’ve seen the electoral
results of the so-called socialists such as Paul
Denis and Serge Gilles. They have been rejected by
the Haitian people.
RL: What is the
future of Aristide and his Fanmi Lavalas party in
Haiti?
PE: Aristide has
played a key historical role in the struggle of the
Haitian people to define their own democracy, and
I’m sure he will continue to be an influence in
the future. Fanmi Lavalas is a political
organization. But I don’t think it will be able to
survive as a political organization simply because
it really has no real autonomy. You could see how it
became totally in disarray after president Aristide
was kidnapped. It was what I would describe as a
charismatic organization, one that depends strictly
on its leader and after that you have nothing in
terms of structure and in terms of capacity to
formulate a political strategy.
A new grassroots movement will have to form that
comes from the street and grassroots mobilizations.
Lavalas is this movement, but Lavalas and Fanmi
Lavalas, although related, are different things.
Fanmi Lavalas is a political organization. Lavalas
is a political philosophy, not a party. Lavalas and
the popular movement are one in the same. It was the
name coined for it by President Aristide. But he did
not invent the reality of it, he just put a name on
it. He doesn’t own it. It owns him.
RL: What lessons can
be drawn from the overthrow of Aristide in February
2004 and the ensuing two years?
PE: The lesson to be
drawn is that it’s not enough to vote for somebody
who is sympathetic to your cause. If you do not stay
mobilized and define your political agenda and
support that political agenda, what will happen is
that either the president or the senators you
elected are going to be extremely vulnerable to
pressure exerted on them from the powers that be or
they’ll start drifting to a more traditional type
of power and start having their own agenda. And of
course both things can happen. It’s obvious when
you look at the last years of President Aristide,
all the senators and deputies had their own personal
agenda and were completely removed from what the
people themselves wanted. So politicians, no matter
what label they are under, have to be kept on a
leash. And the leash is the grassroots movements
permanently mobilized. That is one thing that the
popular movement has learned.
RL: Would you include
René Préval among the new group of leaders in
Latin America who are pushing for regional
integration and challenging U.S. hegemony in the
region?
PE: Préval is a
branch from the same tree. Préval started out like
all of us, a Marxist, but he’s been really forged
or transformed by the popular movement itself. He
was very close to it. We went to school in the
popular movement at the same time. He has a good
feel for what the people of Haiti want and need. As
a leader he does not have the charisma of Aristide,
nor is he inclined or able to communicate with them
the same way that President Aristide could. But I
think that he has the trust of the Haitian people,
which is very important. But if the Haitian people
do not keep up their mobilization and continue to
build it as a structured movement, he will fail.
That is a certainty. He will fail because it is the
fate of any leadership that is left by itself and
does not have behind it a strong an organized
people. He might be pushed so far away from the
original agenda and what the people want that it
would be the equivalent of him being overthrown.
RL: What will Préval
be able to accomplish?
PE: From what Préval
has indicated, he will address the problems of the
poor majority of Haiti, including the most urgent
issues such as terminating that exclusion, that
quasi-apartheid that predominates in this country.
His biggest obstacle might come from those within
the Haitian elite and the traditional politicians,
who will try to embrace him after failing to block
his way. A president only has so much power, and
he’s not the one actually doing everything. He
depends on a team, and he depends on popular
support.
The members of the
elite and political parties could have too much
influence. What they couldn’t win in the election,
they could win by buddying up to Préval. I’ve
heard that everywhere he’s gone, he’s gone with
members of the moneyed elite. That’s all fine and
dandy, he cannot actually govern against the elite
all out, but he cannot govern for the elite either.
I hope they won’t try to destabilize in the same
way they tried to destabilize Aristide. The last two
years have been such a fiasco, I don’t know if
they have the stomach for something as terrible and
disastrous. But Préval will certainly be facing a
lot of pressure. And I think somehow the Haitian
people know that. All I expect from his presidency
is to have the space to organize rather than facing
a truly hostile government. But he will be under a
lot of constraints.
RL: How can Préval
push through reforms that benefit the poor majority
without the elite sabotaging his effort?
PE: We start maybe by
having the kind of dialogue with the moneyed elite
that the people of the South African majority had
with the white minority when the one person-one vote
principal was being adopted. Obviously the elite
want some protection, but they will only have it by
exchanging their privileges for rights. It is
obvious that things cannot continue as they are, so
if there are people who are reasonable within this
elite, some compromise might be reached between them
and the vast majority of people who have been
excluded. The priorities should be set right.
Education, health care, production. These should be
the priorities. We must have a country that
produces. The elite must be engaged in production of
wealth rather than being truly parasites. Laws must
be voted by the new parliament and be acted upon to
close progressively that horrible gap that exists
between the tiny elite and the huge majority.
That’s the only way to go. And if the elite
persist in trying to stand in the way of progress I
think they will have to go the way of the Cuban
elites that had a field day until Fidel came along.
Maybe they are more ready to be persuaded after the
last two years. It was the last desperate attempt to
stem the flow of history. The last two years have
not been particularly happy for the Haitian elites
either. The Haitian people as a whole have suffered
the consequences of Aristide’s overthrow.
Reed Lindsay is a
freelance journalist who has been based in
Port-au-Prince since October 2004.